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The reform of social security pensions is a critical issue for China – a key to enterprise reform,
sound public finance, and the well-being of current and future retirees.  China has already begun to
develop an investment-based system of individual accounts for urban workers, especially those in
state owned enterprises.  Looking to the future, China faces important issues both about improving
the design and implementation of this system and about the transition from the existing unfunded
system to the new arrangements. 
1.  Principles of Social Security Pension Design 
A useful starting place for any academic discussion of pensions is the famous article by Paul
Samuelson (1958) in which he showed that in equilibrium a completely unfunded pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO)  pension system has a positive real rate of return equal to the rate of growth of aggregate
real wages, i.e., to the sum of the growth rate of the population and the growth rate of productivity.
Samuelson’s theoretical analysis assumed an economy with no capital stock and showed that in such2 sschina.092898
a context a pay-as-you-go pension is a desirable policy.
Actual economies do have capital stocks and the marginal product of capital is greater than
the growth rate of aggregate wages.  This implies that a nation can buy retirement income with a
funded pension system at a lower long-run cost than with a pay-as-you-go system, i.e., the savings
deposits in a funded system are less than the tax required in a PAYGO system to provide the same
level of benefits.
There is nevertheless a political temptation in any country to adopt a PAYGO system because
doing so permits giving a windfall benefit to current retirees and to those who will soon be retired
with the cost of that windfall deferred to future taxpayers.  Many countries have succumbed to that
temptation since Bismark introduced the first formal pension system in Germany in the nineteenth
century. And countries with PAYGO systems have created new windfalls from time to time by
increasing benefits and expanding coverage, thus maintaining the popularity and political support for
the PAYGO system.
But now countries around the world with PAYGO systems are recognizing that there is no
more scope for increased windfalls.  There is a realization that the increasing longevity of  populations
everywhere means that tax rates will have to rise in the future just to maintain the current relation
between retiree benefits and preretirement wages. As a result, we are seeing a shift from PAYGO to
funded systems in a number of countries and the active consideration of such reforms in others.
China is already beginning the transition for workers in state owned enterprises from its
unique PAYGO system to a partially funded system based on individual accounts. To the extent that
China succeeds in this shift from a PAYGO to a funded system, it will keep future taxes lower than
they would otherwise be, will help to develop a more efficient capital market, and will facilitate both3 sschina.092898
the management and privatization of the currently state-owned enterprises. 
The choice between a PAYGO system and a funded system is only one of the two important
aspects of designing a pension system.  The second key characteristic is the choice between a defined
benefit and a defined contribution system. In a defined benefit program, retirees receive benefits based
on a formula that typically involves the number of years of work and the past history of wages.  In
contrast, in a defined contribution program, employees (and/or their employers) make contributions
to individual accounts during working years.  The balances in these accounts earn a rate of return
based on the assets in which those funds are invested.  Retirees then receive an annuity based on the
amount accumulated in their accounts.
It is of course possible to have a mixed system that combines defined benefits and defined
contributions.  In 1995 China adopted such a combined two-tier system. Participants will receive a
defined benefit financed by pay-as-you-go taxes and also participate in a defined contribution program
to which employers and employees both contribute.  I return below to discuss both aspects of this
system.
It is also possible to have a conditional defined benefit system. In such a system, individuals
have defined contribution accounts but are also guaranteed a minimum amount (a defined benefit).
Any  shortfall between the annuity provided by the defined contribution account and the guaranteed
defined benefit amount is made up by the government. 
Around the world, social security reforms now generally involve moving from pay-as-you-go
defined benefit systems to funded (investment based) defined contribution systems, often with some
form of conditional defined benefit guarantee. Other combinations are possible.  A government
defined benefit plan can be financed by accumulating a centralized government fund that is invested4 sschina.092898
in new capital. In yet a different approach, some governments are introducing defined contribution
plans with individual accounts that are nevertheless operated as a pay-as-you-go system.  Such
unfunded defined contribution systems provide a notional rate of return, i.e., an accounting rate of
return without any real capital accumulation.  Such notional unfunded defined contribution systems
provide a lower rate of return than a funded system; to be sustainable, the promised return in such
an unfunded system must not exceed the rate of growth of total wages. 
2. Potential Chinese Gain from an Investment Based System
Before discussing the specific features of the current Chinese system, I will use some
estimated  Chinese figures to discuss the magnitude of the advantage of an investment based system
and the extent to which an investment based system can reduce the long-term cost of providing a
given level of retirement benefits.
Consider the following example of a PAYGO system.  Assume that there are 3 workers per
retiree.  The benefits given to retirees are 60 percent of the average wage.  That implies that the tax
rate must be 20 percent of wages.  What does it cost to provide the same 60 percent benefit with a
funded system? That depends on the future growth of aggregate wages and the future productivity
of capital investments.
The World Bank estimates  that over the next several decades as a whole real aggregate
wages in China will grow at about 7 percent or less per year (World Bank, 1997).  I do not know
what the marginal product of capital will be in China in the future. But Gregory Chow (1993)
estimates that the marginal product of industrial capital in China has been 17 percent, with a higher
return on construction and a lower return on residential and retail capital.  I will be very conservative
and assume that in the future the real marginal return on capital will be only 12 percent. A higher rate5 sschina.092898
of return would make a funded system even more attractive.
What do these two numbers imply? In a pay-as-you-go system the tax “contributions” earn
an implicit rate of return equal to the rate of growth of aggregate wages which, looking ahead in
China, can be taken to be approximately 7 percent. Consider an individual who contributes to the
PAYGO system from age 25 to age 64 and then receives benefits from age 65 to 85.  To simplify the
calculation so that the nature of the result is transparent, assume that the contributions are all made
at the midpoint of the working years (i.e., at age 45) and that the benefits are paid at the midpoint of
the retirement years, i.e., at age 75.  The funds are therefore earning a 7 percent  implicit rate of
return for the 30 years from age 45 to age 75.  At 7 percent, one dollar saved at age 45 grows to
$7.60 at age 75.  In these calculations, all amounts are of course measured in the same price levels.
Compare this now with the effect of saving in a funded system with a 12 percent rate of
return.  One dollar saved at age 45 grows to $30 at age 75, about four times as much as in a PAYGO
system in an economy with a 7 percent growth rate of aggregate real wages. 
The implication of this is that the funded system can provide the same level of benefits with
a saving rate equal to only one fourth of the rate of tax required in the PAYGO system.  If the
PAYGO system requires a tax equal to 20 percent of wages to provide a given level of benefits (e.g.,
benefits equal to 60 percent of concurrent wages), a funded system with a 12 percent rate of return
on capital (in comparison to the 7 percent rate of growth of aggregate real wages) can provide the
same benefits with savings equal to 5 percent of wages. 
This represents an enormous long-run “tax” saving, requiring individuals to set aside 5 percent
of their wages during each working year instead of  20 percent.  This not only increases the spendable
income of future employees but also reduces the distortionary effect and deadweight loss of high6 sschina.092898
marginal tax rates.
This calculation is about the long-run.  What about the transition from a pay-as-you-go system
to a funded system? Critics of such a transition argue that it would require current employees to “pay
double”. That seems to imply that if there is a tax equal to 20 percent of wages now, during the
transition to a funded system the combination of the tax required to finance existing benefits and the
saving required to fund future benefits would be double that or 40 percent.  
Such a statement is wrong in two ways.  Most important, the cost of funding future benefits
is far less than the cost of the PAYGO system, a 5 percent saving rate in comparison to the 20
percent tax rate in the previous example.  So the maximum additional cost to current employees
would be the 5 percent required to fund their own future retirement annuities. Second, the PAYGO
tax that starts at 20 percent would gradually decline over time during a transition as new retirees draw
on their funded individual accounts as a source of retirement income.
As a result, a transition is feasible with only a very modest increase in the combined tax-plus-
savings rate in the early years and this combined burden would gradually decline and eventually
become less than the initial PAYGO tax rate (see Feldstein and Samwick, 1997, 1998).
3. The Current Social Security Pension System in China
Since 1995, most municipalities and provinces in China have adopted a two-part plan for
workers in state owned enterprises.  The first part of this plan states that retirees in the future will
receive a defined benefit financed by a PAYGO system.  More specifically, employees who have
worked for 40 years are scheduled to receive benefits equal to 25 percent of the regional average
wage, with a proportional reduction for those with shorter work histories in these state-owned
enterprises.  This benefit would be financed by a payroll tax that the authorities estimate will equal7 sschina.092898
9 percent of wages.  This implicitly assumes that there will be about three workers per retiree (literally
25 workers per 9 retirees).
The second part of the plan is a defined contribution system.  Current employees and their
enterprises contribute 10 percent of wages to individual accounts managed by municipal or provincial
authorities.  Government calculations imply that the resulting annuity benefits would replace about
35 percent of individual’s final year’s earnings. 
The official guidelines for this plan specify that 80 percent of the accumulated funds are to
be invested in government bonds and 20 percent in bank deposits.  In practice, some funds are said
to be diverted into investments in local projects in pursuit of higher yields. The real  returns on
government bonds and bank deposits have been very low and in some recent years have actually been
negative. 
As one considers this new plan, an important question is whether the funding of the defined
contribution part really represents new incremental capital?  Or is it really just a notional PAYGO
plan with no impact on national capital accumulation (as the World Bank implies in its 1997 report)?
This cannot be resolved by looking at the fact that the personal retirement accounts are
invested primarily in government bonds. It depends on whether the bonds purchased for the personal
retirement accounts would otherwise have been sold to the public (including the banks), thus
crowding out other borrowing by enterprises.  
If the existence of these defined contribution accounts causes the government of China to run
correspondingly larger budget deficits, then there is no increase in capital accumulation and the
defined contribution accounts are purely notional investments like any other PAYGO system.  This
would be true because the government would then have to raise future taxes to pay interest (and8 sschina.092898
possibly principal) on these additional government bonds.
But while that is a logical possibility, I see no reason to believe that the existence of these
defined contribution accounts does cause (or will cause) the government of China to run larger
budget deficits.  If my inference is correct, the additional saving that is accumulated in these defined
contribution accounts represent increases in the nation’s capital stock. The individuals and financial
institutions that would otherwise buy the government bonds purchased by the defined contribution
accounts will now buy other private market securities.
What is the rate of return earned on the incremental saving?  If I am correct that the defined
contribution deposits represent increased national saving and are not offset by increases in the
government’s budget deficit, the real rate of return on these incremental savings is the double digit
marginal product of capital (assuming also that the imperfections and misallocations in the capital
markets do not cause too much reduction in the effective rates of return.)  This is true at the margin
for changes in the defined contribution saving even if the government has a budget deficit and uses
some of the defined contribution funds to finance that deficit as long as the amount of deficit financing
does not increase with increases in the amount of defined contribution funds.
The fact that the defined contribution accounts are credited with much lower real rates of
interest than the 12 percent marginal product of capital reflects an implicit tax that the government
levies by requiring these defined contribution balances to be invested in government bonds and bank
deposits with low rates of interest, a tax which reached 100 percent in recent years when the real rate
of interest was driven to zero.
As restrictions on investments are relaxed in the future, these defined contribution accounts
will invest in non-government securities – i.e., in enterprise stocks and bonds – and earn higher1Since the contribution rate in the individual account is fixed by law, the high tax rate on
the return to that saving does not distort saving decisions.  The tax is in effect a payroll tax rather
than a capital income tax.  It distorts work incentives rather than saving incentives.  Whether this
is a good way to collect such revenue in the Chinese context deserves a careful examination.
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returns.  
According to official Chinese projections, the 10 percent defined contribution rate is expected
to provide an annuity equal to 35 percent of the pre-retirement wage. With a seven percent growth
of real wages, this relation between the defined contribution rate and the replacement rate implies a
real rate of return of only about 4 percent. If the defined contribution accounts could earn a real
return equal to the 12 percent marginal product of capital, the proposed crediting of a four percent
real return is equivalent to an effective tax rate of about 65 percent on the defined contribution
return.
1
If broadening the allowable set of investment options eventually allows a higher rate of return,
the same benefits can be financed with a lower contribution rate or the same 10 percent contribution
rate can be used to obtain a higher level of benefits.  For example, doubling the return from 4 percent
to 8 percent would permit cutting the contribution rate from 10 percent to 5 percent while
simultaneously raising the replacement rate from 35 percent to 60 percent. 
The promise of future social security pension benefits can induce households to decrease their
own direct saving.  The exact extent of this displacement is unclear but a credible promise of benefits
equal to more than 60 percent of preretirement wages substantially reduces an individual’s perceived
need for other retirement income. Such a reduction in other saving can of course only occur if the
individuals would otherwise have a high saving rate. As I understand the official Chinese statistics,
households currently save a very large fraction of their incomes, an average of more than 25 percent.10 sschina.092898
I do not know how that average is distributed among different kinds of employees and between urban
and rural sections of the workforce.  But with overall saving so high, it is natural to consider the
possibility that the provision of social security causes a substantial reduction in other household
saving.  In the extreme, a funded defined contribution plan could displace an equal amount of existing
saving, leaving no net change in national saving. Similarly, a promise of benefits in a PAYGO system
could reduce private saving with no offsetting rise in government or pension saving, thus causing a
net decease in national saving.
The key point to note is that, regardless of the induced reduction in other saving,  a funded
plan still causes a higher national saving rate than an unfunded  PAYGO plan. The PAYGO plan with
the same benefits would displace an equal amount of household saving – but unlike a funded plan
would have no pension saving with which to replace it.
4. Alternative Options for the Chinese Defined Benefit Plan
I return now to the first tier of China’s new social security pension system: the flat rate benefit
equal to 25 percent of the average regional wage for those who have worked the full 40 years.
The rationale for providing such a benefit in addition to the defined contribution annuity is
clear: some individuals with low lifetime earnings would have unacceptably low retirement incomes
if they had to depend only on the defined contribution plan. The uniform defined benefit part of the
pension would raise the total pension income and guarantee that it is at least equal to 25 percent of
the average wage in the region.
It is however possible to achieve this goal in a much more cost effective way by modifying
this part of the pensions system in either of two ways (or in both ways).
The first possible modification would be to substitute a funded system for the currently11 sschina.092898
planned PAYGO financing.  According to official calculations, the PAYGO financing is expected to
require a nine percent payroll tax on top of all of the others taxes and mandatory contributions.
Substituting a funded plan – based on investments in existing government bonds or non-government
enterprise securities – could cut the cost by a factor of three or four, from a 9 percent tax to just three
percent or less. This would achieve a major reduction in the distortions caused by the Chinese tax
system as a whole.
The second possible modification would be to focus or target the defined benefit pension on
those with unsatisfactorily low Tier 2 defined contribution pensions instead of giving the full defined
benefit payment to all retirees.  Stated differently, this part of the overall pension could be a
conditional  defined benefit -- filling the gap between the defined contribution annuity and the level
of retirement income that is regarded as acceptable.  If such a reform has the effect of focusing these
benefits on the lower income half of annuity recipients, the financing cost would be cut by more than
50 percent.
A targeted or conditional defined benefit pension would not be a general means tested
program but would focus on the shortfall associated with the defined contribution plan. It would
therefore not have adverse effects on work or other saving.  The combined effect of both of these
options would be to reduce the required tax from the projected 9 percent to less than 2 percent of
earnings.
5. The Transition Path
China must deal with the existing retirees and those who will soon retire as well as with the
long-term problem of future retirees.  
The magnitude of the existing unfunded liabilities to current retirees and workers are12 sschina.092898
particularly difficult to assess in the Chinese context.  In the past, retirement benefits were paid by
the worker’s enterprise without any explicit pension fund or accounting reserves.  Often enterprises
simply continued to pay the preretirement wage to workers when they reached retirement age and
stopped working.  These payments to retirees automatically reduced any surplus that the enterprise
would otherwise have earned.  And if it led the firm to a net loss, that loss would be absorbed by the
central government or as nonperforming bank loans. In effect, the past system of providing retirement
income to employees of state enterprises was effectively a PAYGO system of defined benefits linked
to the final wage and administered by the retiree’s lifetime workplace. 
Now China is adjusting to the change in enterprise ownership and in lifetime work patterns.
Even state owned enterprises must face a more rigorous market test and are not supposed to incur
losses. As part of this shift to a more market based system, the enterprises’ current pension
obligations have been transferred to municipal or provincial governments. Enterprises as a whole are
still taxed to meet these inherited obligations but the tax is no longer based on the specific retiree
obligations of the particular enterprise.  
Although such a  shift of obligations from the enterprises to the government may help the
transition to a more market based system of corporate management and facilitate greater employee
mobility, it is not a necessary concomitant of the move to market based principles for corporate
management and employment. In the United States, when companies have unfunded obligations for
private pensions, this is reflected in lower share prices (reflecting lower future net earnings).  If the
unfunded pension obligations are so large that they imply losses in all future years and a negative
present value of the company’s future earnings, the company is technically bankrupt.  Shareholders
have no residual value.  Pensioners are then paid by a government insurance fund (the Pension Benefit13 sschina.092898
Guarantee Corporation).  This is of course the extreme case.  Usually, unfunded pension obligations
are not that large, leaving a positive stream of future earnings and therefore positive but diminished
share values.  In Germany and certain other European countries, there is no external funding of
private pensions and the unfunded company pension obligations are reflected in earnings and share
values. China could in principle have followed this approach , leaving the unfunded obligations with
the Chinese enterprises.  In practice however this may be harder in present-day China than in the
United States or Germany  because it is harder to enforce a profitability test on state owned
enterprises that lack the discipline of share prices and experienced arms-length banks.
Even with the shift of pension obligations from enterprises to government agencies, there is
much talk in China about ways to provide collateral for these obligations. Although explicit
government bonds might be a useful way to guarantee a future income stream to the pension
beneficiaries, the discussion is generally about providing some form of real capital as collateral. 
Suggestions include transferring to the pension fund an explicit claim on land rents or on the income
generated by some other state owned enterprises. In my judgement, the concern about collateralizing
the existing pension obligations with a transfer of existing assets from the state is largely irrelevant.
If the local or provincial government now owns an asset, there is no real difference between giving
the associated  income stream – e.g., the rental income on land or existing housing -- and giving a
new government bond with the same stream of payments.  Collateralizing the obligation of the
government is largely irrelevant.  This is particularly true if the obligations are regarded as ultimately
the obligations of the central government that have been transferred to municipal and provincial
governments for administrative reasons.
It would of course be different if designating some real asset as collateral causes it to be used14 sschina.092898
differently, i.e., if  the collateral owner is not merely the passive recipient of an income stream but is
able to manage the use of the asset to achieve greater output and profitability.  To the extent that the
pension reforms can be used to put assets into the hands of better managers with clearer motives and
incentives, the result will be to improve the use of China’s resources.
But even if shifting assets to entities responsible for pension benefits causes them to be better
managed, such a shift is economically efficient only if it leads to the best use of those resources
among all the politically feasible options. If it is not, it would increase national income more if China
privatized the state assets or land or housing in the most efficient available way and then gave bonds
to current employers, employees or pension institutions to acknowledge the government’s future
obligations.  If the World Bank is correct in its assessment of the value of these obligations, the bonds
could be amortized over a 40 year period by a tax of about 1.5 percent of GDP. 
6. Concluding Comment
China is noteworthy for its decision to develop a mixed system of defined benefit and defined
contribution social security pensions.  In doing so, it can provide protection for future retirees while
strengthening national saving and expanding the market for enterprise securities.   A greater emphasis
on funded benefits and a shift from an unconditional defined benefit system to a conditional defined
benefit guarantee would reduce the distortionary taxes and focus assistance on those in greatest need.
The current system focuses on a limited fraction of the population, primarily urban workers in state
owned enterprises.  But the experience gained in doing this and thinking about this population can
provide the basis for a stronger national system that can eventually provide retirement security for
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